Iran-US diplomacy: who moves first, or is there a way to move together?

For nearly two decades, one question has haunted Iran-US diplomacy: who should move first? Since the early 2000s, Washington and Tehran have repeatedly faced the same dilemma — should Iran limit its nuclear activities before receiving economic relief, or should the United States ease pressure before expecting Iranian concessions?

This question has become urgent again amid the latest dispute over the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has proposed reopening the waterway if Washington meets a series of conditions, including lifting the naval blockade, easing sanctions and providing guarantees against renewed attacks.

Tehran argues that negotiations cannot begin under conditions of pressure and confrontation. Washington, however, insists that any renewed diplomatic process must address the nuclear issue from the beginning.

This disagreement is the central problem of the current negotiations: both sides are demanding confidence-building measures before taking the first step.

History shows that this dilemma has been addressed before through mechanisms based on reciprocal action. The 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 — the five permanent United Nations Security Council members and Germany — was built around an interim approach in which both sides accepted limited and reversible measures.

Under that agreement, Iran agreed to restrictions on parts of its nuclear programme, including limits on enrichment levels and enhanced monitoring, while the US and its partners provided limited sanctions relief.

This approach later evolved into the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement established strict limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment, with a 3.67 percent cap, while expanding International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and providing sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear restrictions.

The implementation of the JCPOA followed a phased process. First came the agreement in July 2015, followed by Adoption Day in October, then Implementation Day in January 2016 after the IAEA verified Iran’s initial nuclear commitments. Only after verification did major sanctions relief begin.

But when the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and restored sanctions, Iran concluded that technical commitments alone were insufficient — the central problem became the absence of guarantees that a future agreement would survive political changes in Washington.

The US, however, has its own concerns. US policymakers argue that sanctions relief must be linked to verifiable Iranian commitments, because providing economic benefits too early could reduce Washington’s leverage.

As a workable model, reopening the Strait of Hormuz could be linked to a phased easing of restrictions, with each stage monitored by a third party. Qatar, given its role as a mediator, could help facilitate communication, while technical nuclear issues could remain under international verification through the IAEA. The principle would be simple: every Iranian action would have a clearly defined US response, and every US step would have a measurable Iranian obligation.

Recent diplomacy has already moved partially in this direction. The June memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran, supported by Qatar and other mediators, attempted to create mechanisms for reducing tensions, including issues related to military operations and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Later discussions included technical committees and monitoring mechanisms designed to manage implementation.

Qatar’s mediation has also become increasingly significant. Doha has attempted to bridge the gap between Tehran’s demand for confidence-building measures before negotiations and Washington’s insistence that nuclear issues remain central.

The recent message from US Vice President JD Vance to Iranian officials also reflected this dilemma. Washington signalled willingness to explore renewed negotiations, but insisted that the nuclear issue remain part of the discussion. Tehran, meanwhile, has continued to argue that pressure must be reduced before broader talks can succeed.

The Middle East has already paid a high price for the belief that pressure alone can produce strategic outcomes. Military escalation, economic disruption and energy uncertainty have demonstrated the limits of confrontation.

The next diplomatic test will not be whether Iran or the US is willing to make the first concession. It will be whether both sides are prepared to accept a process in which compromise becomes politically survivable.