Why China is resisting a nuclear treaty with the US and Russia
The world's top nuclear-armed countries are set to hold their first-ever trilateral meeting soon, as United States President Donald Trump pushes for a new nuclear arms treaty among them.
The White House has confirmed that Trump will meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin for talks on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit this week in Shenzhen, China.
Top of the agenda for Washington and Moscow is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which lapsed in February, marking the end of more than half a century of limits on US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons.
Trump previously rejected Russia's proposal to extend the treaty, demanding instead a 'new, improved and modernised' deal that includes Beijing. But China has long signalled that it is not ready to join any nuclear arms control treaty.
New START was signed in 2010 by then-US President Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, who served as Russia's president from 2008 to 2012. It was extended in 2021 for five more years under Joe Biden. Under the agreement, Russia and the US could deploy no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads and a maximum of 700 long-range missiles and bombers, and each side could carry out up to 18 inspections of the other's strategic nuclear weapons sites a year.
Earlier in the sequence, START I was signed in 1991 between the US and the Soviet Union and remained in place until 2009. START II, signed in 1993, never came into force, and Russia formally withdrew from it in 2002. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), from 2003 to 2011, had the same purpose but included less monitoring.
The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 ended on-site inspections between the two nations in recent years. Still, the treaty offered some checks and balances to the two biggest nuclear powers in the world, which together possess about 86 percent of all nuclear warheads.
US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Thomas DiNanno said in February: 'Today, the United States faces threats from multiple nuclear powers. In short, a bilateral treaty with only one nuclear power is simply inappropriate in 2026 and going forward.' The same month, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Trump had made clear that true arms control in the 21st century is impossible without including China because of its vast and rapidly growing stockpile.
Washington also wants a successor treaty to address weapons not covered by New START. DiNanno has said a new agreement would have to account for all Russian nuclear weapons, both novel and existing strategic systems, and address the breakout growth of Chinese nuclear weapons stockpiles.
Beijing's unwillingness is largely due to the sheer disparity in warheads. It has an estimated 620 of them, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), while Moscow and Washington now have more than 5,000 each. China's nuclear arsenal, however, is growing faster than any country's — by about 100 new warheads a year since 2023, according to SIPRI.
In February, when New START expired, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said: 'China's nuclear forces are not on the same level as those of the United States and Russia, and China will not participate in disarmament negotiations at this stage.'
Zhao Minghao, a professor at the Institute of International Studies at China's Fudan University, pointed to this 'structural asymmetry' and said China maintains a declared no-first-use policy and a 'minimum deterrence' posture. He also pointed to a 'credibility problem', given the US withdrawal from related treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Sun Chenghao, a fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing, said Chinese assessments also consider US missile defences, precision-strike capabilities and emerging technologies that could weaken China's retaliatory capability. William Yang, the International Crisis Group's senior analyst for Northeast Asia, said there is no clear advantage for Beijing and any treaty would be viewed as a mechanism designed to limit its nuclear modernisation.
According to the analysts, China would engage in a trilateral framework only when the US and Russia first reduce their arsenals towards genuine parity. Alejandro Reyes, a professor at the University of Hong Kong, said: 'The fundamental obstacle is political trust. Each side regards its own nuclear capabilities as defensive while viewing the others' modernisation programmes as potentially threatening.'




