Beijing Recalculates on Trump After Midterm Blow Weakens the US President

In the November 3 midterm elections, voters dealt US President Donald Trump a severe blow. Republicans lost control of both houses of Congress. A new discussion has begun over how China’s leader Xi Jinping will now assess a weakened American president.
Analysis suggests Xi may not fundamentally change his personal assessment of Trump. But Xi is recalculating Trump’s ability to influence US-China relations over the next two years, and how successful the two leaders can be in implementing the new framework for the bilateral relationship they agreed on this year.
Beijing may begin to see Trump as a president who is still interested in personal-level negotiation, but who is steadily losing the capacity to deliver on major political commitments.
The matter is important because both Xi and Trump place great weight on personal diplomacy between heads of state. Trump visited China last May, and Xi went to the United States in September. According to the Chinese statement, at those meetings they agreed to establish a new framework for the bilateral relationship: a constructive and strategically stable relationship based on “respect, fairness and reciprocity”.
Xi has also called for a relationship characterized by “prioritizing cooperation, managed competition, handling differences, and the possibility of peace”. Trump, for his part, has repeatedly stressed his good relations with Xi and expressed confidence that US-China relations can succeed under their leadership.
Despite completely different political backgrounds and philosophies of governance, Xi and Trump agree on one belief: strong leaders can play a decisive role in national decision-making. Both have sought to increase their own authority at home. Beijing regularly stresses the strategic importance of diplomacy conducted through heads of state. Trump, meanwhile, distrusts the traditional foreign-policy bureaucracy and prefers to make deals directly with other leaders.
Yet there is a fundamental difference between them. Xi’s position allows him to turn his personal diplomatic preferences directly into Chinese government policy. Trump, despite an unusually personal approach to decision-making as president, cannot completely bypass Congress, the judiciary or other domestic political forces—especially after the recent midterm results.
When Republicans controlled both the White House and Congress, this difference was not very visible. After returning to power, Trump enjoyed extensive authority within the Republican Party, and a compliant Congress put up no effective resistance to his policies—even when Ukraine-supporting Republicans objected to his attempt to build a rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
China’s foreign ministry reaction to the US midterm results gives a clear indication of Beijing’s outlook. Without commenting on Trump’s political defeat, the ministry’s spokesperson stressed China’s interest in continuing to implement the understandings reached between the two presidents and in advancing their constructive and strategically stable relationship.
Xi had reason to believe that maintaining a stable personal relationship with Trump would help stabilize Washington’s China policy, and that direct talks between the two leaders might even shift US positions on sensitive issues. The midterms have changed that equation. With control of Congress passing to the Democrats, any major deal Trump makes with Xi will now face strict Congressional scrutiny and possible challenge, even though Trump retains significant authority over foreign affairs.
Especially on Taiwan and advanced technology—particularly after the Jensen Huang scandal—Democrats are not much softer on China than Republicans. If Trump tries to give Beijing major concessions in these areas, Democrats can block him through hearings, investigations, budget power and legislation—and can use any such concession as a political weapon.
This has created a paradoxical situation. After losing his majority in Congress, Trump’s urge to prove his leadership through foreign-policy success may grow stronger, making him even more eager to reach a big deal with Xi. But the more necessary it becomes to present such a deal as a victory for the United States, the narrower his room to offer China concessions becomes.
Xi probably understands this. Rather than downgrading the importance of the personal relationship with Trump, he may become even more determined to hold on to this direct channel of communication. Compared with Democratic politicians, Trump is still more inclined to view US-China relations in transactional, gain-and-loss terms, and more ready to change specific policies according to his own judgment. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, he is still a person with whom an understanding can be reached, even if they may no longer have full confidence in his ability to implement such an understanding.
After the Trump-Xi meeting in September, Beijing set the diplomatic language with little objection from the White House. In Beijing’s view, this framework is more than an effort to move beyond the intense trade conflict of recent years. By China’s interpretation, it also signals that Washington is beginning to accept China as a peer strategic power and is willing to keep bilateral competition within defined limits. Beijing hopes the principles of “respect” and “strategic stability” will also extend to issues concerning China’s core interests, such as Taiwan and technology.
But Trump’s acceptance of this diplomatic language does not mean the whole US political system agrees with it. For Washington, strategic stability mainly means managing conflict, protecting US interests and maintaining a competitive advantage. The main lesson of the midterms for Xi may be that he can build personal trust with Trump, but he cannot leave the future of US-China relations to Trump alone.
When Trump was re-elected in 2024, Republicans held both houses of Congress. Just two years later, Democrats have won their biggest victory in generations. This dramatic reversal may strengthen Xi’s view that US politics lacks stability and continuity. But if Xi interprets American political division as a major strategic opportunity for China, he would be mistaken. In US politics, the two parties fight fiercely over domestic issues and presidential authority, but there is considerable consensus between them on the question of strategic competition with China.
Over the next two years, Beijing may gradually shift the priorities of its US policy: maintaining the personal relationship between Xi and Trump, trying to implement existing deals, and avoiding any new major conflict over trade or security. At the same time, it may lower the expectation that leader-level diplomacy can change the fundamental direction of US-China relations. This does not mean Xi is preparing for all-out confrontation with the United States. Beijing increasingly understands that this competition will be long-lasting, so it has even stronger reasons to avoid direct conflict before the situation turns fully in its favour. Maintaining basic stability in US-China relations remains a strategy for buying time for China’s own development. The new framework established by Xi and Trump this year is therefore unlikely to be easily abandoned.




